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Abstract
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can be characterized in terms of respondent and
operant conditioning, resulting in avoidance that is ultimately detrimental. Avoidance as negative
reinforcement becomes paramount to all other reinforcement, precluding engagement with
positive reinforcers. This overvaluation of avoidance may be conceptualized as a reinforcer
pathology (i.e., excessive preference for and valuation of an immediate reinforcer). The current
study offers an initial evaluation of this theoretical framework. The relationships between PTSD
severity and select behavioral economic variables (i.e. future orientation, reward availability, and
delay discounting) were evaluated. Total PTSD severity was inversely related to reward
availability and future orientation, but not delay discounting. Avoidance was inversely related to
total reward availability and environmental reward availability. Hyperarousal was inversely
related to hedonic reward availability and future orientation. Together, these findings offer initial
evidence of a behavioral economic model of PTSD in which avoidance acts as a reinforcer
pathology.
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Introduction
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a debilitating psychological disorder that affects
approximately 7% of the population in the United States (Kessler et al., 2005). Impairment from
PTSD is often chronic and can affect all facets of a person’s life, from their emotional and
physical wellbeing, to their relationships, education, vocation and economic success (Kessler,
2000). PTSD is also commonly comorbid with other enervating conditions such as substance
misuse (Debell et al., 2014; Kessler et al., 1997) and depression (Blanchard, Buckley, Hickling,
& Taylor, 1998; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995), and is associated with
elevated risk for suicide (Kessler, 2000).
In DSM-5, the criteria for a PTSD diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)
specifies requirements for the experience of a traumatic event in criterion A (the event must
involve actual or threatened death, serious injury or sexual violence), as well as symptoms from
each of four symptom clusters, including (B) intrusions, (C) avoidance, (D) negative alterations
in cognition and mood, and (E) altered arousal and reactivity. The criteria require that symptoms
last for at least one month.
While all symptoms typically observed in PTSD may cause significant distress,
avoidance may be uniquely pernicious. In addition to being specified as a symptom, avoidance
appears to contribute to or exacerbate other symptoms. Experiential avoidance (i.e. any efforts to
reduce the frequency or intensity of internal discomfort caused by thoughts, emotions, bodily
sensations, etc.) has been associated with higher PTSD symptoms overall (Tull & Roemer, 2003)
and other trauma-related psychopathology (Tull, Gratz, Salters, & Roemer, 2004). Thought
suppression, in particular, has also been found to be associated with higher PTSD symptoms
(Steil & Ehlers, 2000; Tull et al., 2004). Additionally, Hayes and colleagues (1996) pointed out
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that avoidance has a tendency to reduce acute distress initially, while subsequently increasing
overall distress when chronically used as a coping strategy. Avoidance thus has short term
benefits (reducing distress), but the costs of avoidance are often only realized in the long term.
Historically, Mowrer’s two-factor theory has been invoked to explain the acquisition of
PTSD from a behavioral perspective (Mowrer, 1947, 1960). PTSD can be conceptualized as a
reaction to trauma that occurs as the result of two interacting processes: classical and operant
conditioning (Keane, Zimering, & Caddell, 1985). Classical conditioning describes the
acquisition of emotional responses to trauma-related stimuli. In the case of PTSD, conditioned
stimuli could include any sensory, cognitive or behavioral stimulus in the environment during the
traumatic event and the conditioned response is characterized primarily by fear and anxiety.
When exposed to a conditioned stimulus, the person may experience any of the negative
emotional, cognitive, or neurological responses that they experienced at the time of the actual
trauma, resulting in acute anxiety. Consequently, the individual may develop behavioral patterns
aimed at avoiding these aversive internal reactions. This avoidance characterizes the operant
component of Mowrer’s two-factor model: avoidance is negatively reinforced by an immediate
reduction in the aversive internal experience (e.g., anxiety).
Through the behavioral process of generalization, the avoidance response may be elicited
by stimuli that share properties with the conditioned stimuli, even when there may be no
apparent connection to the traumatic event (e.g. a car backfiring causing the same response as a
gunshot). Additionally, higher order conditioning describes a process whereby stimuli occurring
in the environment when a conditioned response is elicited become conditioned stimuli as well.
Over time, the dual processes of ongoing associative and operant conditioning lead to an
expanding web of associations among formerly neutral stimuli that become cues for avoidance.
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As one’s network of avoided stimuli grows, this limits exposure to many aspects of one’s
environment, including those that previously brought pleasure or enjoyment. Thus, as negative
reinforcement (i.e., avoidance of aversive internal states) increases, opportunities for positive
reinforcement (i.e. previously enjoyed activities) become limited.
While this behavioral model of PTSD is compelling, it merits extension to allow for
further measurement of the mechanisms and predictors of PTSD within the behavioral frame.
One potentially fruitful framework is behavioral economics: a meta-theory that incorporates
operant learning theory and micro-economic principles to better understand people’s decision
making and behavior (Kahneman, 2003). When applying this approach to psychopathology,
theorists have developed the concept of reinforcer pathology (Bickel, Johnson, Koffarnus,
MacKillop, & Murphy, 2014) to refer to a pathological behavior pattern that incorporates
persistently inflated valuation of a reinforcer and preference for immediate reinforcement
regardless of long term consequences. Put in economic terms, the inflated valuation of the
reinforcer reflects a high level of “demand” for that reinforcer, resulting in elevated hedonic
value and excessive allocation of resources to obtain that reinforcer. Past research has evaluated
this by assessing the amount of money that individuals would allocate to the reinforcer in varied
situations (Jacobs & Bickel, 1999; MacKillop et al., 2008; Murphy & MacKillop, 2006). The
preference for the immediate reinforcement regardless of long term consequences reflects
“discounting” of the value of the later consequences due to their temporal distance (Mazur, 1987;
Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). This model has been applied to substance use disorders such as
hazardous alcohol use and smoking, as well as food demand in the context of obesity (Acuff et
al., 2017; Beenstock, Lindson‐Hawley, Aveyard, & Adams, 2014; Bushman, Giancola, Parrott,
& Roth, 2012; Epstein et al., 2007; Mckay, Ballantyne, Goudie, Sumnall, & Cole, 2012; Zhao,
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Nan, Iles, & Yang, 2015). There is some existing literature investigating behavioral economic
indices of substance misuse among individuals with PTSD (Acuff et al., 2018; Murphy et al.,
2013), however, conceptualizing avoidance in the context of PTSD as a reinforcer pathology
appears to be novel.
Avoidance as a Reinforcer Pathology
Avoidance in the context of PTSD can be conceptualized as a reinforcer pathology in
which avoidance becomes increasingly overvalued, and the discounted consequences include
increased symptoms and loss of positive reinforcement. This conceptualization fits with the dual
process model of avoidance discussed above. Individuals with PTSD have ever-increasing
stimuli in their lives that elicit anxiety. Avoidance of those stimuli is reinforced by the
corresponding reduction in distress. The power of this negative reinforcer results in high
valuation (i.e. demand) of avoidance. Individuals’ behavior patterns adapt to access it: avoiding
people, places, smells, sounds, thoughts, activities, and any other environmental stimuli that
might potentially elicit trauma-related distress. As avoidance becomes more generalized, access
to positive reinforcement is reduced, and PTSD symptoms increase. This increase is insidious,
however, and thus, the immediacy of negative reinforcement from avoidance is easy to prefer
over distal consequences. Additionally, sources of positive reinforcement tend to require more
time and effort, resulting in a delay in the experience of reinforcement, so individuals tend to
prefer the immediacy of avoidance.
To examine this conceptualization, the current study evaluated the relationships between
PTSD severity and three behavioral economic constructs that are implicated in this model: delay
discounting, future orientation, and reward availability. Delay discounting is based in Hernstein’s
matching law, which posits that, when given a choice, individuals choose the largest magnitude
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reinforcer (Chung & Herrnstein, 1967; Herrnstein, 1961, 1970). When there is a delay in access
to a reinforcer, however, the value of that reinforcer decreases, evidenced by reduced responding
(Baum & Rachlin, 1969). Thus, humans and other animals generally show a decrement in the
value of a reinforcer when delivered after a delay (relative to no delay) (Mazur, 1987; Rachlin et
al., 1991). This tendency led to the development of structured assessment tasks, in which
respondents are presented with a series of hypothetical choices between an amount of money
available now (e.g. $50) versus $100 in a given amount of time (e.g. 1 month). Most individuals’
patterns of responses generate a pattern of choice that is hyperbolic and as a result, there is a
point at which an individual’s choice switches from preferring larger-later to smaller-sooner
rewards (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Green, Myerson, & Mcfadden, 1997).
The point at which respondents make this switch differs, and some individuals are described as
discounting at a “steeper rate” by choosing the smaller-sooner reward over the larger-later
reward at a higher rate than average, as they more steeply discount the value of the delayed
reward.
This overvaluation of immediate rewards is central to reinforcer pathology (Bickel et al.,
2014). Research on substance use disorders has established that individuals demonstrating
reinforcer pathology discount delays at a steeper rate than average (Amlung, Vedelago, Acker,
Balodis, & MacKillop, 2017; MacKillop et al., 2011). The literature on delay discounting and
psychopathology broadly has also found that major depressive disorder, schizophrenia,
borderline personality disorder, bipolar disorder, bulimia nervosa, and binge-eating disorder are
all related to steeper discounting (Amlung et al., 2019). The literature evaluating this among
individuals with PTSD has been limited, but has shown preliminary evidence that PTSD is
associated with a preference for immediate rewards over delayed ones at steeper rates than
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controls (Engelmann, Maciuba, Vaughan, Paulus, & Dunlop, 2013; Simmen-Janevska,
Forstmeier, Krammer, & Maercker, 2015; van den Berk-Clark, Myerson, Green, & Grucza,
2018).
Delay discounting measurement does not allow assessment of the valuation of the
avoidance directly, but the literature does show a tendency to overvalue immediate reinforcers
among those with PTSD. Given that this has been related to overvaluation of immediate
substance use in spite of delayed consequences among individuals with substance use disorders,
we extrapolate that this also suggests individuals with PTSD may overvalue avoidance in spite of
the long-term consequences. In PTSD, avoidance prevents the extinction of emotional reactivity
to trauma-related cues, thus perpetuating the syndrome of symptoms. Additionally, a pattern of
choosing avoidance in favor of activities that may occasion exposure to trauma cues often has
the result of limiting positive reinforcement (e.g. social engagement).
The consideration of future consequences, or future orientation, is closely related to but
distinct from delay discounting. Future orientation refers to the extent to which an individual
organizes their behavior around potential future consequences. The way that individuals do this
is two-fold: the extent to which the individual considers the consequences of their current
behaviors on future outcomes and the degree to which they allow it to influence their behavior
(Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994). While delay discounting focuses on the
choices that individuals make based on temporal delays, future orientation specifically refers to
the cognitive processes involved in incorporating that information into one’s behavior. These
constructs are clearly related, but distinct within the context of reinforcer pathology (Daugherty
& Brase, 2010). When an individual is highly future oriented, they are unlikely to discount the
negative consequences of their behavior and they are less likely to overvalue an immediate
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reinforcer when they know that it has potentially negative outcomes in the long term. As a result,
they will behave in ways that will benefit their future selves, even at temporary cost to their
present state.
Individuals with PTSD appear unlikely to demonstrate strong future orientation for two
reasons. First, avoidance represents a failure to behaviorally incorporate the clear negative
consequences of increased symptoms and loss of positive reinforcement. Individuals with PTSD
continue to engage in a behavior that has limited long-term benefit. Relatedly, PTSD is
associated with a sense of foreshortened future, which was previously included as a symptom of
PTSD in DSM. Although it was removed as a criterion in DSM-5 (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013), the symptom, which is characterized by a pattern of cognition and emotion
reflecting hopelessness about the future, remains a common negative alteration to cognition and
mood in PTSD. This uncertainty about the future may be reflected both in terms of a lack of
future orientation and a devaluation of delayed rewards and, in turn, the overvaluation of
avoidance due to its immediacy.
Reward availability refers to two components of reward functioning1, or the ability to
seek out and enjoy positive stimuli: environmental and hedonic reward availability.
Environmental availability refers to presence of reinforcing stimuli that an individual has ready
access to. Hedonic availability refers to an individual’s ability to derive pleasure from the
rewards that are available to them. One questionnaire-based measure has been developed in an
attempt to quantify both of these constructs (i.e. one’s access to and experience of positive
reinforcers). Carvalho and colleagues (2011) designed the “Reward Probability Index,” to assess

Note that reward functioning encompasses two interacting processes: “wanting” (i.e. one’s anticipation of and
motivation to seek out a reward) and “liking” (i.e. one’s hedonic response, or the pleasure derived from a reward;
Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009). Reward availability captures two components of the “liking” side of reward
functioning. The present study did not allow for evaluation of the “wanting” aspects of reward functioning.
1
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two sub-constructs: the “Environmental Suppressors” subscale (i.e. one’s access to
environmental reward, herein referred to as environmental reward availability) and the “reward
probability” subscale (i.e. one’s hedonic experience of available environmental reward, herein
referred to as hedonic reward availability).
For individuals with PTSD, a behavioral economic model would predict that as
individuals avoid an ever-increasing number of stimuli, the availability of positive reinforcers
becomes more limited, resulting in low availability of environmental reward. It is unclear,
however, whether hedonic reward availability is affected by avoidance in the same way. On one
hand, as one’s range of avoided stimuli widens and previously enjoyed activities become sources
of anxiety, one may lose the pleasure previously derived in that activity. The presence of
anhedonia as a common symptom of PTSD may serve as evidence of this relationship. Past
research, however, has only demonstrated this relationship for environmental, not hedonic
reward availability (Acuff et al., 2018). It is possible that avoidance only affects the
environmental availability of rewards, while one’s hedonic experience of them remains intact. As
such, PTSD is likely to be inversely related to overall reward availability and environmental
reward availability, but the relationship to hedonic reward availability remains unclear.
The Current Study
The aim of the current study is to evaluate a behavioral economic conceptualization of
PTSD by examining the relationships between PTSD severity and delay discounting, future
orientation, and reward availability. At present, evaluations of this conceptualization have been
limited, however, a better understanding of the influence of delay discounting, future orientation,
and reward availability in the context of PTSD will offer insight into the relevance of this
framework. To this end, we initially examined the correlational relationships between PTSD,
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delay discounting, future orientation, reward availability and a series of potential covariates.
Potential covariates included level of education, income, age, and race/ethnicity. Gender was
also considered as a covariate but was not included due to the disproportionate representation of
men in this sample (n = 99, compared to 15 women). Upon establishing these relationships,
hierarchical regressions evaluated the relationships between PTSD and each behavioral
economic construct while controlling for the relevant covariates. For the relationships that were
significant, we also evaluated the strength of these associations by individual PTSD symptom
cluster. The hypotheses for the relationship between PTSD and delay discounting, future
orientation, and reward availability are as follows:
1. Total and Environmental Reward Availability. We hypothesized that PTSD severity
would be negatively correlated with total reward availability and environmental reward
availability. With regard to covariates, Carvalho and colleagues (2011) found no
differences in responding to the RPI based on race, and thus this was not expected to be a
necessary covariate. The remaining covariates of interest have not been evaluated
empirically in direct conjunction with the RPI. As such, our remaining predictions are
based in theory or indirectly related literature. We expected age, for instance, to be
correlated with hedonic reward availability because the neurocircuitry associated with the
“liking” aspect of reward functioning develops well into one’s 20’s (Heitzeg, Cope,
Martz, & Hardee, 2015). Age was also expected to correlate with environmental reward
availability, given that greater age allows for more time to explore and develop new
rewards, like hobbies. Income also appeared likely to be related, particularly to
environmental reward availability, given that limited income can act as a significant
barrier to accessing rewards. Education was expected to be related for the inverse reason,
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as education can open doors to reinforcement that may not otherwise be available. We
expected two hierarchical regressions controlling for these variables to result in a
significant inverse relationships between PTSD severity and both total reward availability
and environmental reward availability.
2. Hedonic Reward Availability. Given the lack of clarity in the theory and past literature
regarding the relationship between PTSD and hedonic reward availability, our evaluation
of this relationship was exploratory. We completed a hierarchical regression controlling
for the necessary covariates.
3. Future Orientation. PTSD severity was predicted to be negatively correlated with future
orientation. Past literature suggested that income, age, education and race would also be
correlated with future orientation, predicting their inclusion as covariates (Blustein et al.,
2010; Joireman, 1999; Joireman, Sprott, & Spangenberg, 2005; Toepoel, 2010). We
hypothesized that after controlling for these covariates, we would find a significant
inverse relationship between PTSD severity and future orientation. We also predicted that
avoidance symptoms would be predictive of reduced future orientation after controlling
for these covariates.
4. Delay Discounting. We predicted that PTSD severity would be positively correlated with
delay discounting. Based on past literature, we planned to include income, age,
education, and race as covariates if they were related to delay discounting in this sample
(de Wit, Flory, Acheson, McCloskey, & Manuck, 2007; Green, Myerson, Lichtman,
Rosen, & Fry, 1996; Reimers, Maylor, Stewart, & Chater, 2009; Steinberg et al., 2009).
After controlling for these variables, a hierarchical regression was expected to find a
significant positive relationship between PTSD severity and delay discounting. Upon
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evaluating the PTSD symptom clusters, we also expected to find significant positive
relationships, particularly for the avoidance cluster, given the proposed model.
Method
Participants
Participants were 114 veterans and active military personnel who have served in a
combat deployment as part of a conflict following September 11th, 2001. Seventy one percent of
participants (n = 78) met criteria for a PTSD diagnosis. Eighty seven percent of participants
identified as male. Four percent of participants identified as Hispanic. Sixty two percent of
participants identified as White or Caucasian, 31% as Black or African American, 2% as Asian
or Asian American, and 5% as Other. The majority of participants identified as veterans or
retired (81%). Eleven percent reported that they were currently reservists, 5% were in the
national guard and 4% were active duty when they participated in the study. Sixty one percent of
participants identified their branch of service as the Army, 16% as the Navy, 13% as the
Marines, 9% as the Air Force, and 1% as the Coast Guard. While most participants reported one
deployment after 9/11/2001 (40%), 35% reported completing two, 11% reported completing
three and 13% reported completing four or more.
Measures
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD was evaluated using the Clinician
Administered PTSD Scale for the DSM-5 (CAPS-5; Weathers et al., 2013a). The CAPS-5 is a
structured diagnostic interview that queries all criteria required by the DSM-5 for a diagnosis of
PTSD. Thirty items assess participants’ experience of a Criterion A traumatic event and each of
the four symptom clusters: B) intrusions (e.g., “In the past month, have you had any unwanted
memories of [event] while you were awake, so not counting dreams?”), C) avoidance (e.g., “In
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the past month, have you tried to avoid thoughts or feelings about [event]?”), D) alterations to
cognition and mood (e.g., “In the past month, have you had strong negative beliefs about
yourself, other people, or the world?”), and E) alterations to arousal and reactivity (e.g., “In the
past month, have there been times when you felt especially irritable or angry and showed it in
your behavior?”). All items include an initial probe for that symptom, followed by questions
regarding onset, duration, subjective distress, and functional impairment. Interviewers use these
prompts to rate the item’s severity on a 5-point scale (i.e., 0 = absent, 1 = mild/subthreshold, 2 =
moderate/threshold, 3 = severe/markedly elevated, 4 = extreme/incapacitating). Upon
completion of all items, interviewers also rate response validity, overall PTSD severity and
specifications for dissociative subtype. Scores can be presented dichotomously regarding
whether the individual met diagnostic criteria or continuously as a sum score. For the current
study, we evaluated the continuous score.
This version of the CAPS has been psychometrically evaluated among veteran samples
and found to be sound (Weathers et al., 2017). It has demonstrated high interrater reliability and
good test-retest reliability. Internal consistency for the present study was good ( = 0.82).
Additionally, the CAPS-5 is convergent with previous versions of the CAPS and appropriately
divergent from measures of other psychopathology (Weathers et al., 2017). CAPS interviews
were conducted by trained interviewers, all of whom were doctoral students in clinical
psychology with master’s degrees.
Delay Discounting. Delay discounting was evaluated using an 8-item measure (DRD;
Gray, Amlung, Acker, Sweet, & MacKillop, 2014) developed based on the Monetary Choice
Questionnaire (MCQ; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999). The DRD evaluates the degree to which the
value of a monetary reward decreases due to a temporal delay in accessing it. The measure does
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so by asking participants to choose between a hypothetical smaller amount of money (e.g. $30,
$50, $70, etc.) available to them to today and a larger amount of money (i.e. $100) available in
varying amounts of time in the future (e.g. 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, etc.). Preference for the
immediate reward (e.g. $50 today) is coded as 1 and preference for the delayed reward (e.g. $100
in 1 month) is coded as 0. Scores are then added and divided by 8 to create an impulsivity ratio.
Scores close to 1 show a greater preference for the immediate reward and thus correlate to more
impulsive decision making. The eight items included in the measure were selected using an item
based analysis of a larger sample of items. Using exploratory and confirmatory analyses, Gray
and colleagues (2014) found that the selected eight items predicted the majority of the variance
in several delay discounting indices (e.g. area under the curve, k, points of indifference, etc.).
This measure has not yet been evaluated in a trauma population.
Future Orientation. Future orientation was evaluated using the Consideration of Future
Consequences Scale (CFC; Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994). There are twelve
items included in the CFC assessing the extent to which one allows the future consequences of
their actions to influence their current behavior (e.g. “I consider how things might be in the
future and try to influence those things with my day to day behavior”). Participants rated the
extent to which each item was characteristic of them on a 5-point scale (1 = extremely
uncharacteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic). This measure has not been psychometrically
evaluated in a trauma or veteran sample to our knowledge, but psychometric evaluations in
college samples have shown evidence of validity and reliability. Test-rest reliability was found to
be adequate in multiple samples (r = .76, .72; Stratham et al., 1994). The CFC has also been
found to be significantly correlated with the future orientation items on the Stanford Time
Perspective Inventory (r = .43), indicating convergent validity (Stratham et al., 1994). The
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measure is also convergent with measures of delayed gratification. Incremental validity has also
been demonstrated, with the CFC predicting multiple health behaviors over and above alternative
measures of future orientation, as well as measures of conscientiousness, hope and life
orientation (Stratham et al., 1994). Future orientation and delay discounting are conceptually
related, but not equivalent. Past research using both measures has found that they are related but
not singular, with small to moderate effect sizes (e.g. Acuff et al., 2017; Daugherty & Base,
2010). Internal consistency for the present study was good ( = 0.82).
Reward Availability. Hedonic and environmental availability of rewarding activities and
stimuli was assessed using the Reward Probability Index (RPI; Carvalho et al., 2011). The RPI
includes 20 items and two subscales. First, the reward probability subscale includes 11 items
assessing individuals’ hedonic experience of rewards in their environment (e.g. “I have the
abilities to obtain pleasures in my life”) and second, the environmental suppressors subscale
includes 9 items examining the barriers that participants experience when it comes to accessing
reward (e.g. “my behaviors often have negative consequences”). Herein, we refer to the reward
probability subscale as “hedonic reward availability,” and the environmental suppressors
subscale as “environmental reward availability.” Participants rated their agreement on a 4-point
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree). Reward probability subscale items were scored
such that higher scores indicate greater hedonic reward availability. In the case of the
environmental suppressors subscale, high scores indicate fewer barriers and thus greater access
to reward. All items are also summed for a total reward availability score, in which high scores
indicate greater availability.
Past psychometric evaluations of the RPI have been completed primarily using college
samples and use of this measure among trauma exposed samples have been limited. One

14

available study using a trauma exposed college sample did find good internal consistency for
both subscales ( = 0.84-.86), but reported no additional psychometrics (Acuff et al., 2018).
Psychometric evaluations in healthy college samples have demonstrated evidence of reliability
and validity. Test-retest reliability has been found to be adequate after two weeks for the overall
measure (r = .69), the reward probability subscale (r = .68), and the environmental suppressors
subscale (r = .69). Test-retest after one week was excellent for the total score (r = .88) and both
subscales (r = .83 and .86 respectively). The RPI is also convergent with measures of activity
and avoidance, environmental reward, and depression. Discriminant validity was demonstrated
through minimal relationships to social support and somatic anxiety (Carvalho et al., 2011).
Internal consistency for the present study was adequate for the full scale ( = 0.79) and the
reward probability subscale ( = 0.78), but note that for the environmental suppressors subscale,
it was questionable ( = 0.68).
Procedure
All procedures were approved by the university’s intuitional review board as well as the
U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command Human Research Protection Office.
Participants were recruited via flyers, social media, and word of mouth at universities, Veterans
Affairs Medical Centers (VAMC) and veteran’s organizations throughout the mid-south.
Individuals who had served in at least one deployment to a conflict following September 11 th
2001 (e.g. Operations Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom) were invited to screen for the study.
Screening was completed via phone, online, or in person by research project staff, and included
inquiries regarding demographics and military history, in addition to the PCL-5. Veterans who
reported a post-9/11 deployment and who obtained a score of at least 25 on the PCL-5 were
invited to participate in a comprehensive assessment session. During this assessment session,
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participants’ deployment history was confirmed via DD-214 and they completed a battery of
self-report measures and structured interviews, including the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale
for the DSM-5 (CAPS-5; Weathers et al., 2013).
Data Analysis Plan
Analyses were completed using version 25 of IBM SPSS Statistics. Data were evaluated
for appropriateness of analyses using recommendations by Tabachnik and Fidell (2013). With
regard to normality, evaluations of skew and kurtosis were within normal limits based on both
the recommended < |2| threshold and < |2.58| z score threshold for all variables (West, Finch, &
Curran, 1995; Kim, 2013). Data was considered normal.
Univariate outliers were assessed using two methods. First, they were evaluated based on
a z score threshold of > |3.29|. One case did exceed this value in their score on PTSD intrusion
symptoms. However, using the Tukey Outlier Labeling Rule (Tukey, 1977), which creates upper
and lower bounds based on item percentiles, it was determined that this case was not an outlier.
Given that the Tukey method is considered more stringent, no changes were made to these
values. Multivariate outliers were examined using the Mahalanobis distance method
recommended by Tabachnik and Fidell (2013). The chi square value corresponding to .001 for
each of the present analyses varied from 10.82 to 18.47 due to the varying number of covariates
across analyses (see Table 1), which resulted in a range in the number of independent variables.
No cases were identified as multivariate outliers using this method.
Missing data were evaluated using Little’s Missing Completely at Random test (MCAR,
Enders, 2010). Missing data appear to be MCAR (p = 1.00). Visual inspection of the data
suggested that four cases should be removed, as they did not complete the CAPS-5. All
remaining missing values were accounted for by 13 cases who did not complete the income
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variable. It was determined that these were missing as the result of a programming error in the
survey administration software. Given that income cannot easily be estimated or imputed due to
its unpredictable variability, these missing cases were accounted for in analyses using pairwise
deletion.
Initially, the relationship between PTSD severity, reward availability, future orientation,
delayed discounting and all covariates were evaluated using correlations. We then conducted
hierarchical regressions controlling for any covariates correlated with the intended dependent
variable. Individual hierarchical regressions evaluated the relationship between PTSD severity
and total reward availability, environmental reward availability, hedonic reward availability,
future orientation, and delay discounting. For any significant relationships, we conducted
additional hierarchical regressions evaluating the relationships between individual PTSD
symptom clusters (i.e. intrusions, avoidance, alterations to cognition and mood, and alterations to
arousal and reactivity) and the significant dependent variable.
Results
Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table 2, and correlations in Table
3. CAPS total was significantly correlated with RPI total (r = -0.48, p < .001), RPI reward
probability (r = -0.32, p = .001), RPI environmental suppressors (r = -0.50, p < .001) and CFC (r
= -0.20, p = .032). CAPS Cluster B (intrusions) was significantly correlated with RPI total (r = 0.26, p = .007) and RPI environmental suppressors (r = -0.34, p < .001). CAPS Cluster C
(avoidance) was significantly correlated with RPI total (r = -0.24, p = .011) and RPI
environmental suppressors (r = -0.28, p = .003). CAPS Cluster D (negative alterations in
cognition and mood) was significantly correlated with RPI total (r = -0.46, p < .001), RPI reward
probability (r = -0.32, p = .001), and RPI environmental suppressors (r = -0.46, p < .001). CAPS
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Cluster E (altered arousal) was significantly correlated with RPI total (r = -0.41, p < .001), RPI
reward probability (r = -0.30, p = .002), RPI environmental suppressors (r = -0.38, p < .001) and
CFC (r = -0.23, p = .016).
Covariates were selected based on statistically significant correlations or non-significant
trends (p < 0.10) for each dependent variable. This higher threshold was selected to allow for the
inclusion of all possible covariates, particularly given that multiple covariates had p values
ranging from 0.05 to 0.06. A significance threshold of p < .05 was used for all other analyses
presented herein. See Table 1 for the selected covariates.
Five hierarchical regressions tested models explaining variance in RPI total, RPI reward
probability, RPI environmental suppressors, CFC, and DRD, with CAPS total score (reflecting
total PTSD severity) entered as an independent variable. Significant findings (i.e. p < .05) were
evaluated further by conducting a series of separate regressions where we entered individual
PTSD symptom cluster severity scores as independent variables. In examining whether CAPS
total predicted RPI total, step one included income and accounted for 4% of the variance. Step
two included CAPS total and together the model explained 26% of the variance, R2 = .22, F (2,
94) = 16.74, p < .001. In the final model, both income ( = .18, b(S.E.)= .79(.39), CI = [.03,
1.57], p = .043) and CAPS total ( = -.47, b(S.E.)= -.30(.06), CI = [-.41, -.19], p < .001)
significantly predicted RPI total. When we examined each PTSD symptom cluster
independently, we found that all four clusters (i.e. intrusions, avoidance, negative alterations in
cognition and mood, and altered arousal) significantly predicted RPI total after controlling for
income. Table 4 provides additional details.
After controlling for age and income, we assessed whether CAPS total predicted RPIEnvironmental Suppressors. Step one included income and age and accounted for 6% of the

18

variance in RPI-Environmental Suppressors. Step two included CAPS total and the complete
model accounted for 29% of the variance, R2 = .23, F (3, 93) = 12.81, p < .001. Individually in
the final model, income ( = .19, b(S.E.)= .45(.23), CI = [.01, .90], p = .048) and CAPS total (
= -.48, b(S.E.)= -.17(.03), CI = [-.23, -.11], p < .001) significantly predicted RPI-Environmental
Suppressors, but age did not ( = .05, b(S.E.)= .03(.04), CI = [-.06, .11], p = .553). When this
relationship was evaluated by individual PTSD symptom cluster, all clusters (i.e. intrusions,
avoidance, negative alterations in cognition and mood, and altered arousal) significantly
predicted RPI environmental suppressors after controlling for income and age. For details, see
Table 5.
In evaluating whether CAPS total predicted RPI-Reward Probability, no covariates met
criteria for inclusion. CAPS total explained 10% of the variance in RPI-Reward Probability, F
(1, 108) = 11.92, p = .001. CAPS total significantly predicted RPI-Reward Probability,  = -.32,
b(S.E.)= -.14 (.04), CI = [-.22, -.06], p = .001. Upon evaluating this relationship for the PTSD
symptom clusters, negative alterations in cognition and mood and altered arousal significantly
predicted RPI reward probability, but intrusions and avoidance did not. See Table 6 for details.
In examining whether CAPS total predicted Consideration of Future Consequences
(CFC) score, step one included age and explained 3% of the variance in future orientation. Step
two included CAPS total and the complete model accounted for 6% of the variance in CFC, R2
= .04, F (2, 107) = 3.56, p = .032. In the final model, age was not significantly related to CFC ( 
= .14, b(S.E.)= .15(.10), CI = [-.04, .34], p = .128), but CAPS total was ( = -.19, b(S.E.)= .15(.07), CI = [-.29, -.004], p = .045). When evaluated individually by symptom cluster, only
altered arousal predicted CFC, as delineated in Table 7.
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In assessing whether CAPS total predicted DRD, step one included age and explained 3%
of the variance in DRD. Step two included CAPS total and the complete model accounted for 3%
of the variance in DRD, R2 < .01, F (2, 107) = 1.70, p = .188. In the final model, neither age (
= -.17, b(S.E.)= -.005(.003), CI = [-.011, .001], p = .078) nor CAPS total ( = -.06, b(S.E.)= .001(.002), CI = [-.006, .003], p = .520) was significantly related to DRD.
Discussion
The present study explored a behavioral economic model of PTSD in a sample of
combat-exposed veterans. This investigation explored the relations between PTSD and a set of
constructs that reflect time horizon and access to reinforcement/reward, constructs that are not
included in the dominant contemporary conceptualization of PTSD but which might offer insight
into understanding the persistence of PTSD. We posited that one mechanism contributing to the
maintenance of PTSD severity is the overvaluation of avoidance without consideration of the
resulting long term consequences, particularly since avoidance can exacerbate other PTSD
symptoms (Tull et al., 2004; Tull & Roemer, 2003).
PTSD was significantly inversely related to reward availability (as well as both subscales
of the reward probability measure) and to future orientation, but not delay discounting. These
results suggest that PTSD is related to losses of both access to rewarding stimuli in the
environment, capacity to enjoy potentially rewarding activities, and to a diminished ability to
consider future consequences when making decisions. These findings were consistent with our
hypotheses. Interestingly, however, the avoidance cluster was only significantly inversely related
to total reward availability and to the environmental reward availability subscale.
These findings suggest that reward availability, driven by the availability of
reinforcement in one’s environment, is significantly affected by PTSD-related avoidance.
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Consistent with the theory presented herein, preference for and overvaluation of avoidance (i.e.
negative reinforcement) is associated with a lower level of available positive reinforcement.
Other PTSD symptom clusters were also related to self-reported reward availability. Taking into
account that avoidance can contribute to increases in the other symptoms of PTSD (Tull et al.,
2004), perhaps this represents a cyclical relationship in which overvaluing avoidance limits
access to available positive reinforcement, which in turn contributes to worsening PTSD
symptoms, and more entrenched avoidance. These relationships appear to support the idea that
overvaluation of avoidance in PTSD drives a reduction in positive reinforcement and also a
potential worsening of PTSD severity overall. Longitudinal examination will be necessary to
evaluate whether or not this plays a causal role.
Hedonic reward availability, or the capacity to subjectively experience reward, on the
other hand, was significantly related to total PTSD severity, altered arousal and negative
alterations in cognition and mood. The finding of a significant inverse relationship between
hedonic capacity for reward and PTSD severity is novel, given that a study of these constructs in
a sample of young adults found that this relationship was not significant (Acuff et al., 2018). It
suggests that PTSD severity is associated with one’s hedonic experience of rewarding stimuli.
Interestingly, though, avoidance was not related to this variable. It appears that role of avoidance
in these relationships may be less direct than expected.
The relationship between negative alterations in cognition and mood and hedonic reward
availability is intuitive, as anhedonia is a key component of this symptom cluster and loss of
hedonic reward availability is conceptually equivalent to anhedonia (Carvalho et al., 2011). This
suggests that within this sample of post-9/11 veterans, anhedonia plays a strong role in PTSD
severity. The impact of this relationship should not be underestimated, as numbing symptoms
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associated with anhedonia in PTSD are related to worse functional impairment (Kuhn,
Blanchard, & Hickling, 2003; Schnurr & Lunney, 2008; Shea, Vujanovic, Mansfield, Sevin, &
Liu, 2010), greater chronicity, and greater suicidality (Hassija, Jakupcak, & Gray, 2012). It is
unclear, however, how the overvaluation of avoidance may play a role in this relationship based
on the present findings.
The mechanism behind the significant inverse relationship between altered arousal and
hedonic reward availability is less clear. The components of the arousal cluster include
irritability and angry outbursts (typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression), risky
and/or self-destructive behavior, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, difficulty
concentrating, and difficulty with sleep. Perhaps this relationship represents interference of
hypervigilance in the ability to enjoy potentially rewarding activities. Past literature has found
that emotional numbing, which includes anhedonia, was more strongly related to hyperarousal
symptoms than to intrusion or avoidance symptoms (Flack, Litz, Hsieh, Kaloupek, & Keane,
2000; Litz et al., 1997; Tull & Roemer, 2003). It is also possible that the overvaluation of
avoidance contributes to this relationship indirectly. Avoidance relieves much of the acute
distress caused by all components of altered arousal. However, it only does so in the short term,
while actually increasing these symptoms over time (Hayes et al., 1996; Tull et al., 2004; Tull &
Roemer, 2003). As such, this relationship may suggest that overvaluation of avoidance
negatively impacts hedonic reward availability by increasing arousal. Further analyses would be
necessary to evaluate this possibility. Alternatively, these may be distinct symptoms that result
from the same mechanism. For example, reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) posits that high
sensitivity to one’s behavioral inhibition system results in anxious arousal (Johnson, Turner, &
Iwata, 2003), but when it is combined with low sensitivity to one’s behavioral approach system,
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it results in anhedonic symptoms (Kimbrel, Nelson-Gray, & Mitchell, 2007). Among individuals
experiencing high life stress these systems interact to result in both (Hundt, Nelson-Gray,
Kimbrel, Mitchell, & Kwapil, 2007). The present behavioral economic model of PTSD may
benefit from evaluation of the role of RST variables.
As noted, PTSD severity was significantly inversely related to future orientation. Altered
arousal appears to be driving this relationship, as it was also significantly inversely related to
future orientation. Individuals experiencing the symptoms associated with this cluster (e.g.
hypervigilance, exaggerated startle, etc.) are living in a state of perceived threat to their survival;
as such, their fight, flight or freeze responses are persistently activated. When facing an
existential threat, consideration of the distant future in decision making becomes difficult, or
even impossible. Interestingly, though avoidance was not significantly related to future
orientation. This is surprising given that from a theoretical perspective, hypervigilance and
avoidance go hand in hand. In the dual process model of PTSD, severity persists because one
relieves distress like heightened arousal by avoiding even though avoidance subsequently
increases overall symptoms (Keane, Zimering, & Caddell, 1985). Although altered arousal
appears to be driving the loss of future orientation here, avoidance remains a possible indirect
contributor given its relation to arousal in this model.
The finding that negative alterations in cognition and mood was not significantly related
to future orientation was surprising, given that sense of foreshortened future was previously a
DSM criterion for PTSD and it remains a common experience among trauma survivors
(Ratcliffe, Ruddell, & Smith, 2014). It is most closely represented in the remaining symptoms by
components of the negative alterations in cognition and mood cluster, so the lack of significant
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relationship suggests that the mechanism driving this loss of consideration of future
consequences stems from elsewhere.
PTSD severity was not related to delay discounting. This was unexpected considering
that past literature has found this relationship to be significant (Engelmann et al., 2013; SimmenJanevska et al., 2015; van den Berk-Clark et al., 2018). Additionally, given that delay
discounting and future orientation are conceptually similar, it is somewhat surprising that they
show different patterns of association. However, future orientation and delay discounting were
not even significantly correlated with each other. Additionally, delay discounting has historically
been found to be related to income, likely due to the monetary nature of the task (de Wit et al.,
2007; Green et al., 1996; Reimers et al., 2009; Steinberg et al., 2009). The lack of significance
here is a notable anomaly. It is possible that these nonsignificant results could be due to
limitations of this particular measure of delay discounting. We used an eight-item measure, as
opposed to longer measures that have 21 to 60 items. Given the small sample, this may not have
allowed for enough variability in responses to detect an effect. Additionally, meta-analytic
evaluations of delay discounting measures have found that measures using fewer items had
smaller effect sizes (MacKillop et al., 2011). Note, however, that the measure included herein
was developed after this meta-analysis was completed. Future studies may benefit from
investigating these relationships using a longer measure, such as the Monetary Choice
Questionnaire (MCQ; Kirby et al., 1999)
Limitations and Future Directions
While the present study offers initial support for a behavioral economic model of PTSD
in which avoidance acts as a reinforcer pathology, we must acknowledge some important
limitations. The present analyses were cross sectional and thus we cannot extrapolate the
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directionality or causality of any of these relationships. The study from which these data were
drawn, however, is longitudinal, and thus further examination of the data may allow for more in
depth evaluation of directionality. Additionally, the present sample size was small and the
proportion of women who participated was minimal (13%). This prevented the exploration of
gender differences. While a common characteristic of samples of military veterans, this gender
disparity is regrettable given that past literature has found gender differences in some of the
constructs herein (Silverman, 2003).
Due to some gaps in these findings, confirmation of the proposed conceptual model is not
complete. Future studies evaluating this behavioral economic model of avoidance as a form of
reinforcer pathology may benefit from incorporation of additional measures and theories. First,
more direct measurement of avoidance will be necessary to fully understand this model.
Inclusion of self-report measures of experiential avoidance such as the Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire-II (Bond et al., 2011) or the Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance
Questionnaire (Gamez et al., 2011) may be beneficial. Alternatively, the development of a
behavioral economic measure of avoidance would be illuminating. For instance, a measure of the
demand (e.g., how much would you pay to avoid right now?) or discounting of avoidance (e.g.,
to what extent would you choose avoidance now over positive reinforcements of varying value at
varying points in the future) may offer further insight into how avoidance fits into this model.
Additionally, the larger study that the present analyses were part of included an ecological
momentary assessment component in which we evaluated participants’ avoidance on a day to
day basis. The ratio of their avoidance to their engagement with positive reinforcement could
speak volumes to the theoretical components of this model.
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Addition of the motivational (“wanting”) component of reward functioning would also
benefit the proposed model. Reward functioning encompasses two neurologically and
psychologically distinct mechanisms: liking, or the hedonic experience of rewards, and wanting,
or incentive salience (i.e. the motivation that promotes approach towards and consumption of a
reward; Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009). The present study only allowed for the
evaluation of the liking component of reward functioning. Incentive salience, however, fits well
into the proposed behavioral economic model. In order to fully understand individuals’ behavior
in relation to a reward, elucidation of the motivation behind one’s approach behaviors is key.
The present model theorizes about the relationships between one’s PTSD-related behavior and
the behavioral economic variables, but it is unable to illuminate the role of approach motivation.
Additionally, incentive salience represents not only rewards that we explicitly desire, but also
rewards that individuals approach or want without cognitive awareness. This has been
particularly evident in the literature on incentive salience and addiction (Berridge & Aldridge,
2008; Robinson & Berridge, 2008), and avoidance likely fits this characterization as well.
Understanding the role of incentive salience may be necessary to fully understand avoidance as a
reinforcer pathology.
With regard to additional theories that may be beneficial, reinforcement sensitivity theory
(RST) posits that personality and psychopathology can be understood as the result of individual
differences in three biologically based systems: the behavioral approach system (BAS), the
behavioral inhibition system (BIS), and the fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS; Gray, 1982; Gray
& McNaughton, 2000). Research to date on this model in relation to PTSD has evaluated the role
of the behavioral approach and behavioral inhibition systems in reward functioning (Nawijn et
al., 2015) and experiential avoidance (Pickett, Bardeen, & Orcutt, 2011). Additionally, when life
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stress is incorporated into RST, it produces a mix of anhedonia and anxious arousal (Hundt et al.,
2007). Given the importance of these constructs to our model, incorporation of a measure of RST
may allow us to fill some of the theoretical gaps in our findings.
Conclusions
The present study offers some initial support for a behavioral economic conceptualization
of PTSD in which the overvaluation of avoidance acts as a reinforcer pathology. The significant
relationships between PTSD severity and reward availability as well as future orientation suggest
that PTSD has a notable association with central constructs to behavioral economic laid out in
prior reinforcer pathology literature. In addition, the significant direct relationships between
PTSD-related avoidance and overall reward availability as well as environmental reward
availability combined with the potential indirect relationships of avoidance to hedonic reward
availability and future orientation supports the theory that overvaluing avoidance is central to the
persistence of this disorder. Further research will be necessary to solidify this framework, but
these initial findings suggest that such future work may be fruitful.
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Appendix A
Table 1
Covariates included for each regression analysis
Dependent Variable

Covariate(s)

RPI Total

Income

RPI Reward Probability

None

RPI Environmental Suppressors

Income
Age

Consideration of Future Consequences

Age

Delay Discounting

Age

Note. The primary independent variable for analyses was PTSD total severity and when that
relationship was significant, PTSD intrusions, avoidance, negative alterations in cognition and
mood, and altered arousal symptoms were also evaluated as independent variables. These
covariates were used for all analyses using the specified dependent variable.
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Appendix B
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for all variables
Variable
n
Percent
M
SD
Gender
Male
96
87.3%
Female
14
12.7%
Race
Asian/Asian American
2
1.8%
African American/Black
33
30.0%
White/Caucasian
70
63.6%
Other
5
4.5%
Education
GED
1
0.9%
High School Diploma
7
6.4%
Some College
46
41.8%
Associate’s Degree
23
20.9%
4-year College Degree
20
18.2%
Master’s Degree
11
10.0%
Doctoral Degree
2
1.8%
Income
<$10,000
11
11.3%
$10,000-$20,000
11
11.3%
$20,000-$35,000
14
14.4%
$35,000-$50,000
22
22.7%
$50,000-$100,000
29
29.9%
>$100,000
10
10.3%
Age
37.11
7.76
CAPS total
29.27
10.38
CAPS Cluster B - Intrusions
6.34
3.45
CAPS Cluster C - Avoidance
3.30
1.90
CAPS Cluster D - Negative
10.41
4.89
Alterations in Cognition and Mood
CAPS Cluster E - Altered Arousal
9.23
3.33
RPI Total
49.49
6.67
RPI Reward Probability
29.42
4.56
RPI Environmental Suppressors
20.16
3.68
Consideration of Future Consequences
40.59
7.89
Delay Discounting
0.58
0.23
Note. Race was dichotomized for analyses (i.e. White/Caucasian vs. Asian/Asian American,
African American/Black, and Other). Education was dichotomized for analyses (i.e. college
degree obtained vs. no college degree).
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Appendix C
Table 3
Correlations between all variables
6.

7.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

-.48**

-.50**

-.32**

-.20*

-.05

.01

-.06

-.09

.04

2. Cluster B - Intrusion

-.26**

-.34**

-.12

-.12

-.04

-.06

.01

-.02

.14

3. Cluster C - Avoidance

-.24*

-.28**

-.15

-.09

-.05

<.01

.18+

.08

-.02

4. Cluster D - Neg. Alt.

-.46**

-.46**

-.32**

-.16+

-.07

.03

-.12

-.14

-.05

5. Cluster E - Alt. Arousal

-.41**

-.38**

-.30**

-.23*

.02

.05

-.12

-.11

.08

.75**

.86**

.35**

-.04

.03

.21*

.13

.08

.32**

.27**

<-.01

.05

.23*

.16+

.06

.29**

.02

.02

.10

.05

.07

-.16

.07

.09

.16+

-.09

-.09

-.10

-.16+

<.01

.28**

.01

.35**

.16

1. CAPS Total

6. RPI Total
7. RPI Environmental Suppressors
8. RPI Reward Probability

-

8.

-

9. Consideration of Future Consequences

-

10. Delay Discounting

-

11. Education

-

12. Income

.21*
-

13. Age

-

-.01

14. Race
Note. n for analyses including Income was 97, but for the remaining analyses n was 110. Race was coded as White/Caucasian (1) or
other (0). Education was coded as college degree attainment (1) or less than college degree attainment (0). **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10
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Appendix D
Table 4
Individual regressions evaluating variance in RPI total score explained by PTSD symptom
clusters, measured by the CAPS-5
b (S.E.)

C.I.



t

p

R2

0.92 (0.43)

[0.08, 1.77]

0.21

2.16

0.033

0.04

-0.50 (0.19)

[-0.87, -0.12]

-0.26

-2.64

0.010

0.07

1.14 (0.43)

[0.29, 1.99]

0.26

2.65

0.009

0.04

CAPS Cluster C –
Avoidance
Step 1

-1.01 (0.34)

[-1.69, -0.33]

-0.29

-2.93

0.004

0.08

Income

0.69 (0.40)

[-0.10, 1.48]

0.16

1.73

0.086

0.04

-0.61 (0.12)

[-0.85, -0.36]

-0.45

-4.91

<.001

0.20

0.71 (0.41)

[-0.10, 1.52]

0.16

1.74

0.086

0.04

Variable
Step 1
Income
Step 2
CAPS Cluster B –
Intrusions
Step 1
Income
Step 2

Step 2
CAPS Cluster D –
Neg. Alt.
Step 1
Income
Step 2
CAPS Cluster E –
-0.79 (0.19) [-1.16, -0.42] -0.39 -4.21
<.001 0.15
Arousal
Note. S.E. = Standard Error; C.I. = Confidence Interval; Neg. Alt = Negative Alterations in
Cognition and Mood; Arousal = Altered Arousal; Bolded items were statistically significant.
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Appendix E
Table 5
Individual regressions evaluating variance in RPI-Environmental Suppressors score explained
by PTSD symptom clusters, measured by the CAPS-5
b (S.E.)

C.I.



t

p

R2

Age

0.04 (0.05)

[-0.05, 0.14]

0.09

0.87

0.387

0.06

Income

0.50 (0.24)

[0.02, 0.98]

0.21

2.05

0.043

-0.36 (0.10)

[-0.56, -0.16]

-0.34

-3.55

0.001

0.11

Age

0.05 (0.05)

[-0.05, 0.14]

0.10

1.00

0.319

0.06

Income

0.62 (0.25)

[0.13, 1.11]

0.26

2.53

0.013

-0.65 (0.19)

[-1.02, -0.28]

-0.33

-3.48

0.001

0.11

Age

0.02 (0.05)

[-0.07, 0.11]

0.05

0.49

0.622

0.06

Income

0.40 (0.23)

[-0.06, 0.87]

0.17

1.73

0.087

-0.32 (0.07)

[-0.46, -0.19]

-0.43

-4.71

<.001

0.18

Age

0.03 (0.05)

[-0.06, 0.12]

0.07

0.67

0.505

0.06

Income

0.41 (0.24)

[-0.07, 0.89]

0.17

1.68

0.10

Variable
Step 1

Step 2
CAPS Cluster B –
Intrusions
Step 1

Step 2
CAPS Cluster C –
Avoidance
Step 1

Step 2
CAPS Cluster D –
Neg. Alt.
Step 1

Step 2
CAPS Cluster E –
-0.38 (0.11) [-0.59, -0.18] -0.35 -3.66
<.001 0.12
Arousal
Note. S.E. = Standard Error; C.I. = Confidence Interval; Neg. Alt = Negative Alterations in
Cognition and Mood; Arousal = Altered Arousal; Bolded items were statistically significant.
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Appendix F
Table 6
Individual regressions evaluating variance in RPI-Reward Probability score explained by PTSD
symptom clusters, measured by the CAPS-5
Independent Variable

b (S.E.)

C.I.



t

p

R2

CAPS Cluster B - Intrusions

-0.16 (0.12)

[-0.41, 0.08]

-0.12

-1.29

0.200

0.02

CAPS Cluster C – Avoid.

-0.35 (0.23)

[-0.80, 0.10]

-0.15

-1.53

0.128

0.02

[-0.47, -0.32 -3.55
0.001 0.10
0.13]
-0.41 ([-0.66, CAPS Cluster E – Arousal
-0.30 -3.25
0.002 0.09
0.13)
0.16]
Note. S.E. = Standard Error; C.I. = Confidence Interval; Avoid. = Avoidance; Neg. Alt =
Negative Alterations in Cognition and Mood; Arousal = Altered Arousal; Bolded items were
statistically significant.
CAPS Cluster D – Neg. Alt.

-0.30 (0.09)
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Appendix G
Table 7
Individual regressions evaluating variance in Consideration of Future Consequences score
explained by PTSD symptom clusters, measured by the CAPS-5
b (S.E.)

C.I.



t

p

R2

0.16 (0.10)

[-0.03, 0.35]

0.16

1.69

0.095

0.03

-0.26 (0.22)

[-0.69, 0.17]

-0.11

-1.19

0.237

0.01

0.17 (0.10)

[-0.02, 0.36]

0.17

1.78

0.077

0.03

CAPS Cluster C –
Avoidance
Step 1

-0.43 (0.40)

[-1.22, 0.35]

-0.10

-1.09

0.277

0.01

Age

0.15 (0.10)

[-0.05, 0.34]

0.14

1.49

0.138

0.03

-0.23 (0.15)

[-0.53, 0.08]

-0.14

-1.48

0.143

0.02

0.14 (0.10)

[-0.05, 0.33]

0.14

1.47

0.145

0.03

Variable
Step 1
Age
Step 2
CAPS Cluster B –
Intrusions
Step 1
Age
Step 2

Step 2
CAPS Cluster D –
Neg. Alt.
Step 1
Age
Step 2
CAPS Cluster E –
-0.51 (0.22) [-0.95, -0.07] -0.22 -2.29
0.024 0.05
Arousal
Note. S.E. = Standard Error; C.I. = Confidence Interval; Neg. Alt = Negative Alterations in
Cognition and Mood; Arousal = Altered Arousal; Bolded items were statistically significant.
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